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ABSTRACT 
Effects of Anxiety and Depression on Functional Counterfactual Thinking 
 
Brian Sejin Kim 
Department of Psychology 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Rachel Smallman 
Department of Psychology  
 
Anxiety and depression are mental disorders that are common in the United States that share one 
common symptom: rumination. While one may traditionally associate rumination with negative 
affect, some forms of rumination can have positive benefits. For example, counterfactual 
thinking is one type of rumination that can strengthen behavioral intentions and improve 
performance on subsequent tasks. In particular, functional counterfactuals enhance self-
regulatory success by eliciting thoughts about better alternatives to past events and transforming 
these thoughts into plans for future action (Epstude & Roese, 2008). However, there is 
insufficient research on how anxiety and depression affects functional counterfactual thinking. 
The current research examines the effect of anxiety and depression on functional counterfactual 
thinking by examining how different judgment tasks influence participants’ activation of 
behavioral intentions. Participants completed both anxiety and depression measures to determine 
whether these conditions hinder facilitation of intentions following counterfactual thinking. We 
found a pattern of facilitation by counterfactual relative to control judgments that varied as a 
function of the type of action. When the action focused on a behavior, counterfactuals produced 
faster behavioral intention judgments relative to control. However, when the action was focused 
3 
 
on a trait, counterfactuals did not facilitate behavioral intentions relative to control. Neither 
depression nor anxiety scores influenced this facilitation pattern. 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION 
 
Depression and anxiety  
Depression and anxiety are two of the most prevalent mental health problems in United States 
today, with anxiety being the most common (NIMH, 2013). Generalized anxiety disorders affect 
about 18.1% of the U.S. adult population in a given year with 3.1% of the adult population being 
diagnosed for a 12-month period and 5.7% being diagnosed with anxiety for life (Kessler, 
Berglund et al., 2005; Kessler, Chiu, Demler, & Walters, 2005; Olatunji, Cisler, & Tolin, 2007). 
Depression affect about 6.7% of the U.S. adult population in a given year (NIMH, 2013).  
 
Rumination 
One common symptom of both of these mental disorders is rumination, which is defined as 
repeatedly thinking about one’s problem instead of identifying a solution (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Wisco, & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Rumination exacerbates depressive symptoms because 
ruminative thoughts negatively influence depressive mood (Response Styles Theory; Nolen-
Hoeksema, 1991; Kocovski, Endler, Rector, & Flett, 2005). For example, depressed people often 
report persistent ruminations involving analysis of complex social problems in their lives 
(Andrews & Thomson, 2009). Additionally, participants high (vs. low) in social anxiety report 
using rumination or emotional preoccupation as a coping strategy more frequently. This only 
increases anxiety, while distraction coping actually decreases anxiety (Blagden & Craske, 1996; 
Kocovski, et al., 2005). The current study will look at one type of rumination, counterfactual 
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thinking to determine whether depressed or anxious individuals differentially access behavioral 
intentions following counterfactual thoughts. 
 
Introduction to counterfactual thinking 
Counterfactual thoughts are defined as mental representations of alternatives to past occurrences, 
features, and states that takes the form of “if only” (for a recent review, see Epstude & Roese, 
2008). It also allows individuals to transform past mistakes into intentions for future behaviors 
(Smallman, 2013; Smallman & Roese, 2009). For example, after failing a test, a student might 
think, “If only I had studied harder, then I would have made a better grade.” This counterfactual 
statement identifies the behavior necessary to improve performance on future tasks (i.e., studying 
harder), and the thought will increase the likelihood of performing this behavior in the future. 
Counterfactual thoughts give individuals a chance to look back on past events and change their 
behavior for a better outcome in the future (Galinsky, Liljenquist, Kray, & Roese, 2005; 
Markman & McMullen, 2003; McAdams & Albaugh, 2008).  
 
Counterfactual direction 
There are several different ways researchers can code the content of counterfactual statements. 
For example, counterfactual statements can be coded as either upward or downward. Upward 
counterfactual thoughts usually follow a negative event and focus on ways in which the situation 
could have turned out better. In contrast, downward counterfactual thoughts usually follow a 
positive event and focus on how a situation could have been worse (Kocovski et al., 2005; Roese 
& Olson, 1995). An example of an upward counterfactual would be “If I had studied a week 
before my exam, I could have done better on the test.” Upward counterfactuals increase negative 
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affect because the better alternative to the current reality is made salient. A downward 
counterfactual, on the other hand, increases positive affect because the worse alternative is made 
salient (Roese & Olson, 1995). For example, one could think, “If I had not studied at all, I would 
have failed the test.”  
 
Counterfactual structure 
In addition to upward and downward, counterfactual statements can be coded as either additive 
or subtractive. Additive statements are additional acts an individual could have taken while 
subtractive statements involve removing an action. An example of an additive counterfactual 
would be “If I had gone to the movie last night, I would have done worse on the exam.” A 
subtractive counterfactual might be “If I had not studied a week before the test, I would have 
done worse.” Research has found that additive counterfactuals are more functional (Epstude & 
Roese, 2008).  
 
Functional counterfactual thinking 
Recent research shows that counterfactual thinking works as a self-regulatory mechanism 
(Epstude & Roese, 2008; Smallman & McCulloch, 2012). That is, some counterfactuals (i.e., 
functional counterfactuals) are particularly helpful to individuals because they facilitate the 
formation of behavioral intentions. A counterfactual is functional when it promotes an intention 
and connects thoughts about past mistakes to improve future behavior (Smallman, 2013; 
Smallman & Roese, 2009). For example, after getting into an accident, the counterfactual 
statement “I should have put away my phone” suggests that putting away the phone would have 
helped the individual avoid the negative situation. Nasco and Marsh (1999) researched test 
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performance in a group of college students. They found that students who generated 
counterfactuals following an exam showed increased performance on their subsequent exam. 
Another study found that participants who engage in counterfactual thinking after doing poorly 
on an anagram task performed better on a subsequent anagram task (Roese, 1994).  
 
Functional counterfactual thinking, anxiety and depression 
Studies have also examined the links between counterfactual thinking and mental health. For 
example, Markman and Weary (1998) found that increased counterfactual generation motivates 
depressed participants in general, assuming they lack perceived control. Also, participants high 
in social anxiety recorded more negative thoughts and more upward counterfactual thoughts 
compared to those low in social anxiety (Kocovski et al., 2005). However, redundant 
counterfactual thinking has been linked to negative cognitions (e.g., anxiety) and negative affect 
(e.g., depression). In other words, excessive upward counterfactual thinking is associated with 
extreme stress (Epstude & Roese, 2008). However, there are few studies examining how anxiety 
and depression influence functional counterfactual thinking. 
 
The current study examined the effects of depression and anxiety on functional counterfactual 
thinking. Specifically, this study examined whether counterfactual thoughts differentially 
activate behavioral intentions in people high and low in depression and anxiety. We 
hypothesized that individuals high in anxiety and/or depression would not show an increase in 
accessibility to relevant behavior intentions following counterfactual priming.  
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
Undergraduate students (N = 154) participated for partial course credit in their psychology 
course. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 26 years (M = 18.51, SD = .90), 66% were women 
and most were Caucasian (76.6%; 23.3% Hispanic). Participants were notified of their rights as a 
participant and signed a written consent form to participate.  
 
Procedures   
After consenting, participants completed a sequential priming paradigm based on the one used in 
previous counterfactual research (Smallman, 2013; Smallman & McCulloch, 2012; Smallman & 
Roese, 2009). Participants completed 80 trials consisting of 40 trials in the counterfactual and 40 
trials in the control conditions. Within each condition, 20 trials included behavioral information 
and 20 trials included trait information. Each trial’s condition, order, and information type were 
fully randomized.  
 
In each trial, participants made two judgments in succession: the prime (action) judgment and the 
target (intention) judgment. As the trial began, participants first saw a negative event, designed 
to establish context. Events were selected to be representative of the mishaps that college 
students encounter. A simple negative event (e.g., “argued with a friend”) appeared on the screen 
first. Participants were asked to imagine that the event happened to them personally. Two 
seconds later, the prime task (a judgment related to this particular negative event) appeared. The 
prime judgment appeared below the event description and consisted of a judgment cue and an 
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action statement. There were two prime conditions, manipulated on a within-subject basis: 
counterfactual versus control. The manipulation hinged on the judgment cue that preceded this 
action statement (e.g., counterfactual vs. control). A crucial aspect of the prime task was to hold 
constant the main informational content of the priming judgment (e.g., the action statement) 
while varying only the presence of a counterfactual component. Therefore, the only thing that 
differed between the counterfactual and control trials was the judgment cue preceding the action 
statement. Thus, the cue contained either a counterfactual marker (“could have”) versus a control 
marker focusing on factual aspects of the statement that followed. 
 
In the counterfactual trials, a counterfactual cue was paired with the action statement. For 
example, if the negative event was “argued with a friend” then a counterfactual cue would be 
paired with a relevant action (e.g., “Should have” + “listened before speaking”). Participants 
decided if this action (e.g., listening before speaking) was something that could have changed the 
outcome of the event (e.g., arguing with a friend). Participants pressed a key labeled “yes” or 
“no” to indicate their decision. In the counterfactual trials, one of two cues was randomly 
inserted prior to the action statement (“could have” or “should have”). This variation was 
introduced to rule out the interpretation that effects depended on particular syntax. 
 
In the control trials, a factual cue was paired with the action statement. The control trials 
involved a recency judgment. For example, if the event was “argued with a friend,” then a 
control cue would be paired with a relevant action (e.g., “In the last week have” + “listened 
before speaking”). Participants decided whether they had actually performed the action (e.g., 
listening before speaking) within the past week. As in the counterfactual trials, participants 
pressed a key labeled “yes” or “no” to indicate their decision.  
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Between the prime (action) task and the target (intention) task in each trial, a blank screen 
appeared, asking participants to press a key to continue. This “pause-screen” was included to 
eliminate the influence of motor facilitation on RTs (i.e., remove the effect of successive 
identical key presses). 
 
The second judgment, the target task, was a behavioral intention judgment. Participants made a 
judgment about possible future actions, which were always related to the negative event included 
in the prime task (e.g., arguing with a friend). The target task consisted of a target cue and a 
future action. On each trial, the target cue “In the future I will” appeared first on the screen. After 
a 2 second delay, the relevant action appeared directly below the target cue (e.g., “listen before 
speaking”). Participants decided whether they would be likely to perform the action in the future 
(e.g., “In the future I will listen before speaking”), pressing a key labeled “yes” or “no” to 
indicate their decision. Thus, this procedure permitted a within-subject manipulation of 
counterfactual thinking that controlled for similarity in content across counterfactual and control 
trials. 
 
The counterfactual content was manipulated such that the information in the prime and target 
task included either behavior or trait information. For example, when thinking about arguing 
with a friend, participants would either consider listening before speaking (a relevant behavior) 
or being more understanding (a relevant trait). Information was consistent across prime and 
target tasks within a trial such that a behavior in the prime (e.g., “Could have listened before 
speaking” or “In the past week have listened before speaking”) would be paired with the same 
behavior in the target (e.g., “In the future I will listen before speaking”). As such, a trait in the 
prime (e.g., “Could have been more understanding” or “In the past week have been more 
12 
 
understanding”) would be paired with the same trait in the target (e.g., “In the future I will be 
more understanding”). 
 
After completing the reaction time task, participants completed the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory 
for Adults (STAI; Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1977) and the Center for 
Epidemiological Studies Depression Scale (CES-D; Radloff, 1997). The 40 question STAI was 
used to measure anxiety and consisted of two, 20-question subscales measuring both 
participants’ state and trait anxiety. To measure state anxiety, participants were asked to indicate 
how they “feel right now, that is, at this moment”.  Participants responded to each state anxiety 
item (e.g., I am presently worrying over possible misfortunes) on a 4-point Likert scale (not at all 
[1] to very much so [4]). To measure trait anxiety, participants indicated how they feel generally. 
Participants responded to each trait anxiety item (e.g., I feel nervous and restless) on a 4-point 
Likert scale (almost never [1] to almost always [4]). The CES-D (Radloff, 1977) was used to 
measure depression. Participants were asked to indicate how often they have felt a certain way 
(e.g., I felt that I could not shake off the blues even with help from my family) in the past week. 
Participants responded to each of the 20 items on a 4-point Likert scale (rarely or none of the 
time [1] to all of the time [4]). 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Intention facilitation 
Outlier RTs, defined on a within-subject basis as RTs > 2.5 SDs above the within-condition 
mean, RTs < 2.5 SDs below the within-condition mean, or RTs < 200 ms, were trimmed (5.3% 
of RTs). Within each type of action, outliers were distributed approximately equally between 
counterfactual and control conditions (behavior: 1.2% and 1.4%; trait: 1.5% and 1.2%). Data 
were log-transformed to correct for skewed distribution; untransformed means were presented 
for clarity. 
 
To provide a more sensitive test of the hypothesis, only RTs for intentions judgments in which 
participants responded “yes” (86% of all trials) were examined. Because the focus was on 
whether counterfactuals facilitated responding to an intention, the effect depended on subject’s 
consideration of the intention plausible and desirable. The subset of intention RTs with “yes” 
responses were distributed evenly across the counterfactual and control conditions within each 
type of action (behavior: 25% and 26%; trait: 26% and 24%). 
 
A 2 (prime judgment: counterfactual vs. control) x 2 (action type: behavior vs. trait) repeated-
measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of prime judgment, F(1, 151) = 14.679, p < .001, and a 
non-significant main effect of action type, F(1, 151) = .548, p = .460.  The interaction effect 
indicated that the pattern of facilitation by counterfactual relative to control judgments varied as 
a function of the type of action, F(1, 151) = 11.718, p = .001. When the action focused on a 
behavior, counterfactuals produced faster behavioral intention judgments relative to control, 
14 
 
t(151) = -5.108, p < .001. When the action was focused on a trait, however, counterfactuals did 
not facilitate behavioral intentions relative to control, t(151) = -0.458, p = .647.  
 
Depression  
To calculate depression, we took the sum of participants’ responses to each of the twenty CES-D 
items (D = .91; M = 16.97, SD = 10.76). Participants who scored 16 or greater met the criteria for 
clinical levels of depression. We then dummy coded depression (0 = non-depressed, 1 = 
depressed).  
 
To analyze the effect of depression on facilitation of behavioral intentions, we reran the 
repeated-measures ANOVA described above with the dummy coded depression score as the 
between-subjects factors, and prime and action type as within-subjects factors.  
 
A 2 (prime judgment: counterfactual vs. control) x 2 (action type: behavior vs. trait) x 2 
(depression: depressed vs. non-depressed) repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of 
prime judgment, F(1, 150) = 14.220, p < .001, and a non-significant main effect of action type, 
F(1, 150) = .541, p = .463. We found the action by prime interaction effect indicating that the 
pattern of facilitation by counterfactual relative to control judgments varied as a function of the 
type of action, F(1, 150) = 11.232, p = .001. However, we did not find any other significant 2-
way interactions either between action and depression (F(1, 150) = .000, p = .998) or prime and 
depression(F(1, 150) = .241, p = .624. Also, the 3-way interaction was not significant, F(1,150) 
= .491, p = .484. For depressed participants, when the action focused on a behavior, 
counterfactuals produced faster behavioral intention judgments relative to control, t(69) = -2.788, 
p = .007. When the action was focused on a trait, however, counterfactuals did not facilitate 
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behavioral intentions relative to control, t(69) = -0.404, p = .687. This pattern was the same for 
individuals who were not clinically depressed. When the action focused on a behavior, 
counterfactuals produced faster behavioral intention judgments relative to control, t(81) = -4.399, 
p < .001. When the action was focused on a trait, however, counterfactuals did not facilitate 
behavioral intentions relative to control, t(81) = -0.251, p = 803. 
 
Trait anxiety 
To calculate trait anxiety, we took the sum of participants’ responses to each of the twenty STAI 
trait items (D = .94; M = 41.55, SD = 12.14). Trait anxiety had no well-established cut-off score, 
so we left it as a continuous variable. We reran the repeated-measures ANOVA described in the 
first analysis with trait anxiety included as a covariate, and prime and action type as within-
subjects factors.  
 
A 2 (prime judgment: counterfactual vs. control) x 2 (action type: behavior vs. trait) with trait 
anxiety as a control variable repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a non-significant main effect 
of prime judgment, F(1, 150) = 1.821, p = .179, and a non-significant main effect of action type, 
F(1, 150) = 1.225, p = .270. The action by prime interaction effect indicated that the pattern of 
facilitation by counterfactual relative to control judgments varied as a function of the type of 
behavioral information, F(1, 150) = 6.266, p = .013. However, no other 2-way interactions were 
significant. That is, there was no effect of action by trait anxiety (F(1, 150) = .878, p = .350) or 
prime by trait anxiety (F(1, 150) = .084, p = .772). Additionally, there was not a significant 3-
way interaction (F(1,150) = 2.570, p = .111).  
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State anxiety 
To calculate state anxiety, we took the sum of participants’ responses to each of the twenty STAI 
state items (D = .91; M = 43.52, SD = 10.92). We reran the repeated-measures ANOVA 
described in the first analysis with state anxiety included as a covariate, and prime and action 
type as within-subjects factors.  
 
A 2 (prime judgment: counterfactual vs. control) x 2 (action type: behavior vs. trait) with trait 
anxiety as a control variable repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a non-significant main effect 
of prime judgment, F(1, 150) = 1.435, p = .233, and a non-significant main effect of action type, 
F(1, 150) = 0.429, p = .513 Additionally, we did not find any significant 2-way interactions. The 
prime by action interaction effect did not indicate that the pattern of facilitation by counterfactual 
relative to control judgments varied as a function of the type of behavioral information (F(1, 
150) = 0.405, p = .525) and there was no action by state anxiety interaction (F(1, 150) = .243, p 
= .622) or prime by state anxiety interaction (F(1, 150) = .088, p = .767).  There was also not a 
significant 3-way interaction (F(1,150) = 0.033, p = .856).  
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CHAPTER IV 
CONCLUSION 
 
The current study replicated Smallman’s (2013) findings by showing that facilitation for 
behavioral intentions following counterfactual primes occurs when the action is a behavior but 
not when the action is a trait. However, our hypotheses that depressed individuals would differ in 
their accessibility to relevant behavior intentions following counterfactual priming was not 
supported. We found that both depressed and non-depressed individuals showed similar 
facilitation of behavioral intentions. They responded faster to intentions when the intention 
followed a counterfactual prime focused on a behavior than when the intention followed 
counterfactual prime focused on a trait. Additionally, we found no significant difference in 
intention facilitation based on levels of state or trait anxiety. 
 
Because we did not find differences in the facilitation of behavioral intentions between depressed 
and non-depressed participants, this suggests that both depressed and non-depressed participants 
are equally able to activate relevant behavioral intentions. However, it is possible that depressed 
individuals may have problems bringing these activated intentions into awareness and translating 
them into subsequent future behavior change. That is, depressed people show symptoms such as 
sleep disturbance, fatigue, weight changes, psychomotor disturbances (e.g., retardation), 
increased indecision, concentration difficulty, and low self-esteem (Garber, Kouros, & Morris, 
2015). Additionally, they perceive the likelihood of future success to be small because the do not 
believe they, as individuals, have the capabilities necessary for success and cannot change their 
outcomes (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Marsh & Weary, 1994).  Because depressed 
individuals generate similar counterfactuals in terms of structure as non-depressed individuals, 
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(Quelhas, Power, Juhos, & Senos, 2008), we hypothesized that facilitation for behavioral 
intentions might be the reason for these individuals bleak view. Quelhas et al. (2008) found that, 
following counterfactual thought generation, depressed individuals were less likely to: feel 
prepared for the future, to avoid similar negative outcomes, and show behavioral changes. Our 
findings suggest that, because depressed and non-depressed individuals show the same 
facilitation of behavioral intentions following counterfactual thoughts, these differences in 
behavioral change may be due to a subsequent process, such as bringing the activated behavioral 
intention into awareness or converting these intentions into future behavior change.  
 
Another potential limitation of the current study could be the lack of power to detect differences 
between depressed and non-depressed participants. Future research should include a larger 
sample size and other demographic groups. The current study investigated only a college student 
sample, so different age groups may show different cognitive functioning or a broader range of 
depression scores. Additionally, we could target individuals with clinical levels of depression to 
increase the proportion of individuals in that condition.  
 
 Research on this topic is important due to a large number of people diagnosed with anxiety and 
depression today. Depression can occur at any age and co-occur with other illnesses such as 
cancer, heart disease, Parkinson’s disease, and diabetes (NIMH, 2013). Many of these diseases 
involve complex treatment regimens, which depressive symptoms can make difficult to follow. 
In fact, most people with anxiety and depression have difficulty with perceived control (e.g., 
deciding whether or not to study for another hour to help one better understand the concept of 
what they are learning) and coming up with constructive thoughts and strategies to convert them 
into action to make better decisions in the future (Markman & Weary, 1998). Anxiety, 
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specifically, can prevent individuals from engaging in normal, daily activities and the symptoms 
can get worse if not treated (NIMH, 2013). Furthermore, the hope of this research is to 
encourage others to explore this newly researched topic on effects of anxiety and depression on 
functional counterfactual thinking.   
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